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TERRORISM AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME 
Questions of Responsibility and Complicity 
* By PROFESSOR SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL 
Terrorism is a phenomenon in the contemporary world which 
occupies the attention of the international community. Terrorism 
as an international crime is readily more comprehensible and 
susceptible of clearer definition than sheer acts of terrorism by 
whomsoever performed. 
This paper is confined to questions of responsibility and 
complicity in connection with terrorism as an international 
crime, whatever the definition is ultimately adopted of 
"terrorism," and whatever the meaning to be ascribed to an 
"international crime." 
Taking the cue from Professor Yoram Dinstein,l some of the 
salient features and common elements present in the varying 
definition of terrorism as an international crime still permit a 
scientific and intelligible treatment of a number of questions 
relating to responsibility and complicity. 
As terrorism is inter alia an offense against the peace and 
security of mankind according to the latest draft code undertaken 
by the International Law Commission,2 it follows that one of the 
* M.A., D. Phil. (Oxon); Docteur en Droit (Paris); 
LL.M. (Harvard); Visiting Professor of International Law and 
Business at Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark 
College. 
1. See the lead article, opening statement by Professor 
Yoram Dinstein, seven characteristic dichotomies, pp.4-5. 
2. UN Doc. A/CN.4/368, Compendium of Relevant 
International Instruments, 1983; Yearbook of the ILC, 1986, 
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inevitable elements is the object or victim of terrorism as a 
crime. Beyond the individuals or groups of persons suffering the 
casualties or physical injuries as the result of acts of 
terrorism, the target is the victim state. Terrorism is a crime 
directed against a state, hence it offends the conscience of 
mankind and the international community at the same time. 
Whatever the ultimate, intermediate or immediate target of 
terrorism, there is to be found a victim state, against which 
acts of terrorism are directed. The victim is primarily a state 
in conventional definition,3 although of late international 
organizations as subjects of international law have been upgraded 
as possible victims of acts of terrorism along with entities such 
as National or People's Liberation groups or Organization or 
Committee. 4 Acts of terrorism committed or directed against 
international organizations or national liberation movements may 
fall within the definition of terrorism as an international 
crime. 5 
A second element which is pertinent to the questions of 
responsibility or liability is the author or perpetrator or 
subject of the international crime of terrorism. Whether or not 
A/CN.4/387. 
3. See the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment 
of Terrorism;-adopted by the International Conference on the 
Repression of Terrorism on November 16, 1937, cited in U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/368 at pp.18-22, especially article 7, para. 2. 
4. Report of the Geneva seminar on the Phenomenon of 
Terrorism in the Contemporary World, 23-25 June 1987, by the 
Organization of Islamic Conference No. OIC/ISPT/REP. 1 at p.9 
(Terrorism and International Law). 
5. Ibid., pp.15-16 ({2) Terrorism and National Liberation 
Struggles). 
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the applicable definition extends to crimes committed by 
individuals or groups of persons without the aid, assistance or 
participation by a state or an international organization, it is 
clear that it may involve an active part or role performed by a 
state or a group of states or an international organization or a 
group of international organizations. The involvement of a state 
may consist in the encouragement or toleration of the commission 
or organization in its territory or control of acts of 
terrorism. 6 It is this second element which is relevant to the 
questions of responsibility which will form the first principal 
limb of this presentation, the other main concern of this study 
is centered upon the questions of complicity or degrees of 
participation or involvement in the planning, commission or 
actual consummation of terrorist acts or activities, or other 
supporting activities, as accessory before or after the facts of 
the crime of terrorism. Attention will accordingly be 
concentrated on these two themes, viz., responsibility and 
complicity. 
RESPONSIBILITY 
One of the initial questions that remains uppermost in the 
minds of those attending the colloquium on Terrorism as an 
International Crime relates to "responsibility." The question 
6. See, e.g., Article 4(D) of the Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, fourth report by 
Minister Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur of the International 
Law Commission, 1985, A/CN.4/387, 1985 Yearbook of the ILC, vol. 
II, Part one, pp.63-86, at pp.77-80, E. Terrorism. 
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may be validly raised as to who may be held responsible for a 
terrorist act or an act of terrorism as an international crime. 
I. THE INDIVIDUAL OFFENDER 
Clearly, any person may be criminally responsible for the 
commission of an offense against the law of nations. No one 
individual is exempted or exonerated from this responsibility. 
There is no such rule as "the King can do no wrong" or "the 
Emperor is above the law" or "Caesar's wife is above suspicion." 
As terrorism may easily include common crimes or ordinary 
offenses of murder, assassination, kidnapping, torture, etc., a 
person may be found guilty of such crimes under domestic law, by 
a national judicial authority. The same person may at the same 
time be personally and criminally responsible for violation ot 
the code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. 
As a matter of human rights, the accused will not be put in 
double jeopardy under two different systems, one domestic or 
national and another international. Care should be taken lest 
the offender escape both jurisdictions for fear of offending the 
rule "ne bis in idem." The problem may be one of jurisdiction, 
prescriptive, adjudicative or enforcement, or lack of or 
concurrence of any such jurisdiction or competence of one or more 
national authorities. The amenability of an individual person to 
the law of nations on terrorism is beyond controversy. Each and 
every man, woman or child is capable of committing an act of 
terrorism, the degree of liability or gravity of punishment may 
depend on several factors to be taken into consideration. The 
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individual may be criminally liable and personally punishable, as 
well as civilly responsible for the pain, physical injury, death, 
and suffering caused to others by his terrorist acts. 
II. THE OFFICIAL OR ORGAN OF A STATE OR INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 
That a person is responsible individually for his or her 
acts of terrorism is no longer in question. But it is 
questionable whether responsibility persists in the event of a 
superior order. The defense or excuse of Hrespondeat superior" 
has application in certain legal systems, under constitutional 
law or administrative law or simply in accordance with the 
general principles of law, criminal and civil. 
Whatever the extent of individual personal responsibility 
for acts of terrorism as an international crime in a given 
instance, there is also a distinct possibility that as an 
official, or representative or organ of a state or an 
international organization, the acts of terrorism in question may 
have been commanded by the state or international organization or 
committed on its behalf or at its instigation. Whatever the 
degree of attributability or imputability, the acts of terrorism 
committed by a state agent or organ of a state is clearly 
attributable or imputable to the state, and for which the latter 
is responsible. The same is true of an official or organ of an 
international organization. The individual is responsible both 
personally and as an organ or agent of the state or international 
organization, quite apart altogether and separate from the fact 
that the action or omission may invariably engage the 
responsibility of the state or international organization. 
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The identical position is attained even if the individual 
official, agent, organ or representative may have exceeded his 
authority. In order to admit this "objective responsibility" of 
the state for acts committed by its officials or organs outside 
their competence, "they must have acted at least to all 
appearances as competent officials or organs, or they must have 
used powers or methods appropriate to their official capacity."7 
III. THE STATE OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
Should the concept of state responsibility be extended to 
international organizations as appears to be the rule since the 
Reparations case (1949)~8 ~hatever is said of state 
responsibility in regard to a state is also equally or 
approximately applicable to an international organization, 
including a national liberation organization created by an 
international organization. 
7. Claire Claim, France v. Mexico (1929), Verzyl, 
Presiding Commissioner, French-Mexican Claims Commission, 5 
R.I.A.A. (United Nations Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards) 516. (4) Responsibility of Mexico for actions of 
individual military personnel, acting without orders or against 
the wishes of their commanding officers and independently of the 
needs and aims of the revolution. 
8. Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the 
United Nations Case Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p.174. 
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The next series of questions relate to the nature of the 
responsibility incumbent upon the state or international 
organization for an internationally wrongful act attributable to 
it, which in the case under examination is an act of terrorism as 
an international crime. 
1. Can an Internationally Wrongful Act be Both an 
International Crime and an International Delict? 
The classification is found in article 19 of the ILC draft 
on State Responsibili ty 9 for an act of a state which constitutes 
a breach of an international obligation, being an internationally 
wrongful act. Such an act which results from the breach by a 
state of an international obligation so essential for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that 
community as a whole constitutes an international crime. The 
draft articles neither specify terrorism as an international 
crime, nor preclude acts of terrorism from the inexhaustive list 
of international obligations of essential importance to the 
safeguarding of the right to self-determination of people lO and 
the maintenance of international peace and security.ll 
Paragraph 4 of draft article 19 labels all internationally 
wrongful acts not constituting international crimes under 
paragraph 2 as international delicts. Since the list in 
9. 
pp.30-34, 
10. 
11. 
See Yearbook of the ILC 1980, vol. II, Part Two, 
atr).32. 
Ibid., draft Article 19, (2), and (3)(b). 
Ibid., draft Article 19, (2) and (3)(a). 
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paragraph 2 is not exhaustive, there may be a host of 
internationally wrongful acts which may fall under either 
category or partially under both categories. For present 
purposes, however, attention is confined primarily to terrorism 
as an international crime. 12 
2. What are the Distinguishing Features of an 
International Crime? 
The criteria adopted in draft Article 19 point to the 
"seriousness of the breach," the "essential importance of the 
obligation breached" and "the necessity to protect the 
fundamental interests of the international community." The acts 
listed, such as, acts of aggression, colonial dominance, genocide 
and apartheid, are glaring examples of offenses against the peace 
and security of mankind. Terrorism has recently been added to 
such a list in the context of the draft code of offenses against 
the peace and security of mankind. Terrorism appears to answer 
all the three criteria of an international crime, having regard 
to the seriousness of the breach, the importance of the 
obligation breached and the necessity to protect the fundamental 
security interests and peace of mankind. 
Another prerequisite might perhaps be found if the analogy 
of an international crime in the private law sense can be 
12. For the mixed reception of draft article 19 as 
reflected in the debates of the Sixth Committee in 1978-1982, see 
Marina Spinedi: "Les Crimes Internationaux de L'Etat Dans Les--
Travaux de Codification de la Responsabilit~ des Etats Entrepris 
Par les Nations Unies," EUI Working Paper No. 88, Feb. 1984, 
pp.4 2-4 6. 
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adopted. The attributability of an internationally wrongful act 
is completed without regard to the question of fault on the part 
of the state or international organization. As has been seen, 
the wrongful acts are attributable even when the officials or 
organs of the state act in excess of or against instructions. 
This is close to the theory of strict or absolute liability or 
liability without fault. The state is in a way vicariously 
responsible for practically all the acts of its officials or 
organs performed in that capacity even though outside the scope 
of their normal functions. State responsibility may be said to 
be thereby engaged. 
To complete the components of an international crime, in 
private law or otherwise, the maxim: "Actus reus non facit nisi 
mens sit rea" is still valid. The state of mind to be imputed to 
the state or international organization must be one satisfying 
the test of the existence of a criminal intent, so as to render 
an internationally wrongful act a crime. By way of illustration, 
out of frantic panic, a fighter pilot mistook an intruding 
commercial aircraft as a hostile fighter-bomber and without 
following normal procedures for intercepting civilian aircraft 
shot it down without due warning in breach of international civil 
aviation regulations. The act is clearly an internationally 
wrongful act, and would also be an international crime had the 
pilot intended to shoot down an innocent commercial airliner. 
The results would be the same if the missiles were to be fired 
from air-to-air or from ship-to-air, or if the shot was 
authorized at the moment of clear and present danger. The only 
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difference would be that the downing of such commercial airliner 
with passengers would be an internationally wrongful act without 
being an international crime, only if the intention imputed to 
the state was self-defense or self-protection even though it 
turned out to be a mistake of identity or otherwise. But if the 
intention was unmistakably to shoot down an unarmed civilian 
aircraft in regular commercial flight, the act of terrorism would 
have been accompanied by the criminal intent clearly imputable to 
the state or international organization, as the case may be. 
3. Are the Consequences of State Responsibility for 
Terrorism as an International Crime the Same as Other 
Internationally Wrongful Acts? 
One question that has frequently been raised is whether a 
state or international organization could ever be criminally 
responsible for an offense constituted by acts of terrorism. 13 
While opposition and doubts have been voiced in the General 
Assembly, a good number of states appear to have accepted the 
possibility of a state or international organization being 
criminally responsible for internationally wrongful acts 
constituting international crimes. 14 Without taking sides in 
this acute controversy, it is sufficient to establish that a 
state or international organization may be responsible under the 
law of state responsibility for acts of terrorism as an 
international crime. It makes little or no difference whether 
13. Marina Spinedi, ibid., at pp.45-47. 
14. Ibid., p.46, and notes 140-149, pp.152, and notes 
129-132, pp.148-150. 
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the private-law terminology of "criminal liabili ty" or the 
international-law term of "state responsibility" is employed. 
The issue is fully covered. Compensation or reparation may still 
be available even when wrongfulness is precluded by certain 
circumstances. 15 
The next logical step is to examine the consequences of 
state responsibility or the secondary, as opposed to primary 
rules of obligations flowing from its breach of the primary rules 
requiring abstention from acts of terrorism. The consequences of 
state responsibility in respect of an international crime would 
seem not to differ whether we call it criminal liability by name 
or simply state responsibility. Nor does it make any difference 
in effect whether the same set of facts or circumstances are 
characterized as an international crime or an international 
delict. 
IV. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME COMMITTED BY A 
STATE OR AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. 
Independently of the nature of the responsibility encumbent 
on the state, whether or not it is designated as criminal, 
certain legal consequences flow from the breach of its primary 
obligation not to commit an act of terrorism as an international 
crime. The problem of definition of the international crime of 
terrorism has been discussed elsewhere by other confreres at the 
Colloquium. The primary rules regarding components of acts of 
15. See, in particular, draft article 35 of the draft 
articles on~ate Responsibility, cited in note 9 above. 
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terrorism as an international crime, including the wrongful act 
and the criminal intent, has also been briefly mentioned. We may 
now proceed to consider the legal consequences of state 
responsibility for terrorism as an international crime. 
Following an interesting study made by the International 
Law Commission in Part II of the draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, certain principles appear to have emerged, which 
may be stated in outline in more tangible terms. 
(a) The Three Parameters 
On close inspection, the consequences in terms of rights 
and obligations, as secondary rules, may consist in three 
different parameters, namely: 
(i) The new obligations of the state which has committed 
an international crime of terrorism; 
(ii) the new rights of the injured state victim of the acts 
of terrorism characterized as an international crime; 
and 
(iii) the rights and obligations of third states or third 
organizations. 
It is permissible to examine the secondary rules or legal 
consequences of state responsibility in each of these parameters. 
(b) The First parameter! the State Committing an 
International Crime 5~IS 
Obligations on the part of the state responsible for acts 
15~ See, e.g., Document A/CN.4/342 and Add. 1-4, Yearbook 
of the ILC 1981, vol. II, Part one, pp.71-101, at pp.82 et seq. 
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of terrorism characterized as an international crime include the 
following steps: 
(i) Ex nunc or an obligation to cease all wrongful 
activities or acts of terrorism, or an obligation to 
desist from further encouragement or assistance 
furnished to perpetrate acts of terrorism as an 
international crime. This obligation ex nunc only 
applies to continuing wrong or violation, such as 
intrusion of territorial air space which may be 
stopped by withdrawal from the air space. On the 
other hand, if the acts of terrorism consist in a one-
shot or two-shots affair, then it is an accomplished 
act which can no longer be stopped. 
(ii) Ex tunc or an obligation to reestablish the situation 
which would have existed if the breach had not been 
committed, where restitution is still practicable. 
Restitutio in integrum would be required of the state 
which has committed an internationally wrongful act. 
But the nature of the act does not always permit 
restitution. If, for instance, the aircraft was shot 
and disintegrated in mid-air while the bodies of the 
passengers killed were scattered over the ocean, no 
resuscitation or reintegration would seem possible. 
In such event, there would at least be an obligation 
to pay the injured state a sum of money corresponding 
to the loss suffered and not yet repaired. 
(iii) Ex ante or an obligation to give satisfaction in the 
form of formal apologies for the breach, a formal 
reconfirmation of the obligation breached, or the 
declaration to the effect that measures would be taken 
in order to prevent recurrence of similar breaches. 
Thus, an arrangement was set up to monitor flights of 
commercial airlines in the polar or northern routes to 
prevent the repetition of the downing of a civilian 
aircraft in regular commercial flight. An undertaking 
to adopt appropriate measures to prevent recurrence of 
such terrorizing acts would be in order. 
(c) The Second Parameter, the Injured State, Victim of 
Terrorism as an International Crime 
The injured state may demand fulfillment of, or compliance 
with, secondary obligations, ex nunc, ex tunc and ex ante from 
the state whose act was internationally wrongful. The exercise 
of corresponding rights would be permissible upon giving due 
notification of the breach. The injured state may resort to 
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counter-measures to compel compliance with its demand or else to 
suspend performance of its obligation under a bilateral treaty or 
multilateral instrument which may yield satisfactory results. 
Legitimate sanctions may be imposed to induce compliance, such as 
boycotting or rupture of diplomatic relations or refusal to 
extend recognition or withdrawal of recognition of the regime or 
state engaging in acts of terrorism. In particular, the injured 
state is entitled to 
(i) cessation of the wrongful act if it is of a continuing 
nature, or abatement of continuing injury or damage; 
(ii) payment of appropriate compensation or reparation, 
equivalent to the loss suffered; and 
(iii) satisfaction by an assurance that similar wrongful 
acts would be prevented in future by adopting 
pre~ent~ve or prec~utionary mIgsures or more effective 
monItorIng or warnIng system. 
(d) The Third Parameter, Third State or Every Other State 
It is appropriate to complete the current analysis by a 
brief examination of the contents of the third parameter, viz., 
obligations entailed by an international crime, such as 
terrorism, for every other state. Third states or every other 
state may be said to be under the following obligations: 
(i) not to recognize as legal the situation created by or 
brought about by acts of terrorism, whether by taking 
of hostages or assassinations or tortures; 
(ii) not to render aid or assistance to the state or 
organization which has committed such crime; and 
(iii) to join other states in affording mutual assistance in 
carrying out the obligations flowing from the acts of 
16. Ibid., pp.9l-l01. 
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terrorism. An international body, consisting of 
member states, may adopt a resolution penalizing such 
criminal acts or imposing sanctions on the recalci-
trant state, by expulsion from the organization or 
curtailment of its voting rights or other legitimate 
sanctions proportional to induce compliance and 
prevention of future repetitions. Measures envisaged 
under this rubric may be adopted in conformity with 
the procedures embodied in the United Nations Charter 
with respect to the maintenance of internation~l peace 
and security, and other multilateral treaties. 17 
COMPLICITY 
An analysis will be attempted in Part B of this paper to 
comprehend the different methods and degrees of involvement of a 
state in terrorist acts which would engage state responsibility. 
Complicity may take different forms. 
I. STATE TERRORISM 
This is a direct involvement. When a state or its 
officials or organs undertake or organize terrorist acts directed 
against another state. The state committing terrorism is the 
author of the international crime of terrorism. It is the 
principal perpetrator of the crime, as if the button was pushed 
by the state itself to destroy a peaceful civilian aircraft in 
regular commercial flight deliberately to inflict loss of lives 
on the passengers. 
The state may do the planning, organization, or training of 
terrorists to undertake terrorist activities against another 
17. See Yearbook of the ILC 1985, vol. II, Part one (Sixth 
Report by Professor Riphagen, A/CCN4.1389) at pp.13-14. See 
Dinstein, in note 7, pp.14. 
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state. This could be done singly, or in concert with other 
states or international organizations. Equality of partnership 
or joint-venture in the crime of terrorism may constitute a form 
of complicity, beyond conspiracy as it takes the form of actual 
participation. All participating states or organizations act as 
principals or partners in crime. The division of labor may vary 
from each act of terrorism, such as terrorizing a village, or 
explosion of a school bus, by agents or organs of a state or more 
than one state or organization. 
II. STATE-ASSISTED OR STATE-ENCOURAGED TERRORISM 
Assisting or encouraging the commission of terrorist acts 
engages the responsibility of the state for the international 
crime as a form of complicity. Active participation is not 
needed. Their assistance by giving information, lending 
facilities, harboring terrorists from neighboring countries, 
etc., may be sufficient to create responsibility of the state for 
the act of terrorism. Thus, the 1937 Geneva Convention on the 
Suppression of Terrorism lB reaffirms "the principle of 
international law in virtue of which it is the duty of every 
State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist 
activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts 
in which such activities take shape." This obligation imposes on 
every state not only the duty to refrain from assisting or 
lB. See article 7 para 7 of the Convention, see compendium 
of Relevant-rnternational Instruments, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/36B, at 
p.lB. 
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encouraging acts of terrorism, but also the duty to prevent and 
punish activities of this nature, and also to collaborate with 
other states for this purpose. Failure to perform this duty 
engages state responsibility for the resultant acts of terrorism. 
III. STATE-TOLERATED TERRORISM 
The toleration of "activities organized for the purpose of 
carrying out terrorist acts in another State" amounts to a crime 
against peace and security of mankind as envisaged in the report 
of Minister Doudou Thiam19 to the International Law Commission. 
The imputation of knowledge and therefore responsibility to the 
state for whatever internationally wrongful acts conducted on its 
territory within its own border is not unwarranted. This is 
consistent with the duty to warn, to abate and to prevent harm as 
indicated in the Corfu Channel Case 1949. 20 Allowance, 
permission, acquiescence or toleration of terrorist activities 
known to be directed against another state clearly entails the 
responsibility of the territorial state. A state is under an 
obligation to prevent the training, organization or preparation 
of such activities within its territory. 
It is conceivable in exceptional circumstances that the 
territorial state may be aware of the activities being conducted 
on its soil and remain yet powerless to prevent them. The 
obligation not to tolerate may in part be fulfilled by 
19. Report of the ILC 1986, Yearbook, vol. II, Part two, 
Article 11(4)0. 
20. ICJ Reports, 1949, p.4, at p.22. 
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collaboration with an international authority or other states to 
avert the danger resulting from terrorist activities or to inform 
other states or international body of the situation. 
IV. MANUFACTURE, PROCURING, OR SUPPLYING OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, 
EXPLOSIVES OR HARMFUL SUBSTANCES WITH A VIEW TO THE 
COMMISSION OF A TERRORIST ACT. 
The act of terrorism need not be the ultimate destruction 
or seizure of victims or targets, but may comprehend other parts 
of activities contributing to the materialization or final 
consummation of a criminal act of terrorism. Thus, as early as 
1937 an international convention lists as prohibited "the 
manufacture, obtaining possession, or supplying of arms, 
ammunitions, explosives, or harmful substances with a view to the 
commission in any country whatsoever of an offence" designated as 
acts of terrorism. It is the purpose for which arms and 
ammunitions are procured, obtained, manufactured or supplied that 
makes it an internationally wrongful act. This is the initial 
part of a series of acts composing the crime of terrorism. It is 
the knowledge or object of the supply of such harmful substance 
that provides the linkage or complicity with the crime of 
terrorism itself, for which the state as accomplice would be held 
responsible. 
CONCLUSION 
The lesson to be learned from the preceding analysis of 
state responsibility and state complicity in the context of 
terrorism as an international crime is that a collective and 
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unified response to international terrorism is one effective 
means to prevent or discourage the staging of terrorism. 
Avowedly, states of different size, structure, ideology and stage 
of economic development have openly opposed acts of terrorism in 
every form or manifestation. To implement this opposition, 
states could collaborate more closely with the international 
community by becoming parties or adhering to the international 
instruments designed to prevent, suppress and punish acts of 
terrorism. 21 By so promoting measures of prevention and 
expanding the scope of enforcement of legitimate sanctions 
against terrorism, the rate of such international crimes could be 
lowered, if not immediately suppressed. The Colloquium is 
finding the right path and should be encouraged to continue its 
search for ways and means to combat terrorist activities which 
threaten the peace and tranquility of mankind. 
Sompong Sucharitkul 
21. See, e.g., The Tokyo Convention, on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, September 14, 
1963, 704 UNTS. 219; The Hague (Hijacking) Convention, for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16, 1970, 
22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133; Montreal (Sabotage) Convention, 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, September 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151; 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, December 
17, 1979 U.N. Doc. A/34/819, 74 A.J.I.L. 277 (1980); Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 
December 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 13 I.L.M. 41; European 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, November 10, 1976, 
T.S. No. 90, 15 I.L.M. 1272; and recently, Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime 
Navigation, March 10, 1988, Rome, 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988) and 
Protocol. 
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